Barrier Protection by Russell, Denise
BARRIER
PROTECTION
The need to conserve Australia’s 
natural wonders seems to be so 
obvious that it’s hardly worth arguing 
about. But Denise Russell disagrees. 
What should our relation be to the 
natural world—especially the most 
beautiful parts of that world such as 
the Qreat Barrier Reef?
I
 would like to defend the ‘no-harm principle’: that 
if we know that an activity is harmful or if we are 
unsure of its effects then we should prohibit, re­
strict or encourage against it. But what is behind 
this? Why not harm the Reef? Is the answer—as a 
number of environmental thinkers have claimed—based 
in ethics?
Traditional ethical theories have recently been ex­
tended beyond the human domain so they could be a 
useful starting point to answer this question. Some 
writers have offered a case for not harming non-human 
animals and ecosystems on the basis of morality. Some 
people resist this argument, partly because we are used to 
thinking of morality as exclusively in the human do­
main, and because we are used to regarding it as a feature 
of human interaction that involves intention and will.
The first plank of this opposition to the use of 
morality could simply be based on human chauvin­
ism and habit and so not constitute a good reason 
for not extending the moral domain. Again, while 
it’s generally believed that only humans exercise 
intention and will, this belief can be challenged just 
by close observation of, for instance, your local dog. 
And there is enough evidence that dolphins inter­
act with humans in some situations with obvious 
intent and will, for example, when they have saved 
humans from shark attack or drowning. One ac­
count I particularly like is of a person who was 
sitting on a beach on Hinchinbrook Island when a 
dolphin came by and threw her a fish and then swam 
off. O f course, this observation doesn’t provide a 
sufficient argument for an ethical defence of the 
environment, since it only embraces some excep­
tional members of the non-human world, and it 
doesn’t encompass ecosystems.
It should also be noted that, following the 
above reasoning, some humans would be excluded 
from the purview of morality. Very young infants 
and people in a coma may lack intention and will, 
but surely they should be in the moral domain ?Tom 
Regan suggests a way out of this dilemma mounting 
a distinction between “moral agents” and “moral 
patients”. Moral agents are “individuals who 
have...the ability to bring impartial moral princi­
ples to bear on the determination of what... morally
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ought to be done and...to freely choose or fail to 
choose to act as morality requires”. “Moral pa­
tients lack the prerequisites that would enable 
them to control their own behaviour in ways that 
would make them morally accountable.” The per­
son in a coma and the young infant would fit into 
this category but so, also, would non-human ani­
mals who are conscious, sentient, and have beliefs 
and memories. Regan then goes on to claim that 
moral patients should be included in the moral 
domain along with moral agents. In particular,
moral agents or patients have a right not to be 
harmed. However, even if Regan is right this 
argument will not help me in my endeavour, as 
Regan’s ethics do not extend to ecosystems. Some 
animals are also excluded—such as those who are 
conscious and sentient but not capable of having 
beliefs or memories.
Regan’s stopping point does seem rather arbi­
trary. Others make no distinction in the animal 
world. Peter Singer’s slogan is that “all animals are 
equal”. This is based on his claim that “there are
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no good reasons, scientific or philosophical, for 
denying that animals feel pain”. And “there can be 
no moral justification for regarding the pain that 
animals feel as less important than the same amount 
of pain felt by humans”. Morality then is based on 
the minimisation of suffering. Singer’s position 
only covers the animal domain, but plants and 
trees are capable of suffering too, so if it is immoral 
to harm a whale, why not a wattle? But does this 
make sense?
At the risk of caricature, we can roughly divide 
traditional ethical theories into a) a rights based 
morality such as Regan’s view); and b) utilitarian­
ism (such as Singer’s view); and c) an ethics based 
on moral principles. To say that trees have rights 
is empty. If we allowed that all living things have 
rights there would be no possible fair way of 
deciding between competing rights, so this moral­
ity could never be a guide to action. From the 
point of view of utilitarianism one would have to 
make an assessment of the pleasure or pain in­
curred by a particular act and then opt for the least 
painful. But this would involve impossible calcu­
lations. How could you weigh the pain of a wattle 
against, for example, the pleasure of a human in 
not having their house undermined by the tree? 
Again, what moral principle is violated in harm­
ing a wattle? Thou shalt not kill? This principle 
cannot be universal as we might want to kill, for 
instance, certain viruses. We could try amending 
the principle to Thou shalt not kill’ except what­
ever causes harm to humans. But then how should 
we interpret ‘harm to humans’? How can we avoid 
harming some life forms in order to eat? So tradi­
tional ethical theories seem to lead us nowhere if 
we are trying to find a standpoint from which to 
answer the question: why not harm, the Barrier 
Reef? What about an ethic based on ecology?
Ecology is ‘the broadly based branch of biology 
that deals with relations between living organisms 
and their environments’. The perspective of 
interconnectedness is obviously informed by ecol­
ogy. Not all ecologists take up the issue of how best 
to maintain an ecosystem, but some who do have 
suggested an ethical stance described by Arne 
Naess as ‘deep ecology’. The essence of deep ecol­
ogy is to ask ‘deeper questions’, to go beyond 
science into realms of ethics and politics. Naess 
describes the basic tenets of deep ecology as fol­
lows: first it rejects the standpoint of the human- 
in-environment in favour of a view of all “organ­
isms as knots in the biospherical net or field of 
intrinsic relations. An intrinsic relation between 
two things A  and B is such that the relation 
belongs to the definitions or basic constitutions of 
A  and B, so that without the relation A and B are 
no longer the same thing”.
Second, he argues that “the equal right to live 
and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious 
value axiom”. Naess claims that restricting this 
axiom to humans is an anthropocentrism which
has detrimental effects upon the life quality of 
humans themselves. This quality depends in part 
on the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive 
from close partnership with other forms of life.
Naess’ first contention that humans are rela­
tional seems reasonable, but his value axiom is 
problematic. It draws on a philosophy of rights 
and, as I argued above, if there is no clear way of 
deciding between competing rights then to as­
cribe them is an empty gesture. Naess grants that 
some killing and exploitation of other species may 
be necessary but then where does one set limits? A 
doctrine of equal rights is useless here.
Some other ecologists have tried to base an 
ecological ethic on the intrinsic value of ecosys­
tems, a value that is supposed to be independent 
of any awareness, interest or appreciation of it by 
humans. It might, for instance, reside in the sys­
tem’sstability, integrity or beauty. Butwhenpushed 
as to why we should accept such a basis for value 
these ecologists say things like “if we harm nature 
then we are harming ourselves”. This throws the 
basis of valuation back onto humans. It seems very 
hard to make sense of an idea of intrinsic value.
A further problem with an ecological ethic is 
that it could be elitist. If people don’t understand 
what, for instance, ‘stability’ is or understand it in 
relation to the Reef, they have no basis for valuing 
it. This would leave the business of judging such 
an ethical value to the educated elite.
1 began this inquiry by posing the question: 
why not harm the Barrier Reef? Perhaps the diffi­
culties 1 have come across in trying to get an 
answer arise because I am searching in the ethical 
domain. On the surface it seems to be an ethical 
question but maybe it would be more fruitful to 
look elsewhere.
Why not harm the Reef? Because we place a 
value on it and it isn’t prudent to harm that which 
you value. Humans place the value. The value 
isn’t there in the world, just like it isn’t in a 
painting, another human being, a shark. But just 
because it is humans who ascribe such value isn’t 
to say that the value is instrumental— in other 
words, that it somehow serves human needs or 
interests. It may be instrumental, but it might not 
be. For instance, a painting may be of value 
because it is with $30,000 on the market but also 
because it is an expression of human creativity. 1 
may value another human because she is amusing 
or a good conversationalist (in other words, for 
instrumental reasons), or simply because she is the 
same species living her life in her own way quite 
independent of my life. I may value a shark be­
cause I can catch it and sell it to a fish shop or out 
of respect for a highly efficient enduring predator 
which has enjoyed a very bad press.
I value the Reef for both instrumental and 
non-instrumental reasons. Included in the former 
are: it provides me with great holidays, I enjoy 
eating Reef fish and 1 enjoy reading about the life
To say that 
trees have rights 
is empty.
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TROUBLED WATERS
The Qreat Barrier Reef Marine 
Park vuas set up in 1975 with an 
Authority (the QBRMPA) to 
manage the Park. The man- 
agement philosophy is at odds 
with the position I have developed 
in this article. Rather, it seeks to 
achieve conservation with the 
minimum of regulation. It aims 
to ensure a high level of usage 
which is consistent with main- 
tenance of the ecological system 
and which will be accepted as 
reasonable by society.
The management states that “An understanding of the Reef and the processes which maintain it is nec­
essary before sensible decisions can be 
made about, competing uses, and before 
limitations can be placed on potentially 
destructive uses”.
Zoning plans have been developed in 
line with these management principles 
but it is important to note that a Marine 
Park is not the same as a Marine National 
Park. Most of the GBR Marine Park is 
zoned for general use which restricts min­
ing and spearfishing only. Less than 10% 
in the Cairns section, for instance, is zoned 
Marine National Park and even this area 
has varioussub-zones.The largest has only 
fairly light restrictions on some fishing 
and collecting. Very small areas are desig­
nated as Preservation Zones.
Yet the aim to support a high level of 
use and a diversity of human activities in 
a fragile environment runs counter to the 
aim of conservation. Marlin fishing is a 
good example of weaknesses in the man­
agement philosophy. Marlin fishing com­
petitions were widely promoted in Cairns 
as recently as early this year and Lizard 
Island hosted a Marlin Classic where mar­
lin weighing hundreds of kilos were hauled 
onto the beach. This is a barbarous sport, 
little different from big-game hunting. It 
has been reported that big game fishing 
boats frequently call into a local Preserva­
tion Zone to entertain their clients when 
the martin aren't biting, whereupon the 
crew dangle a tail roped tuna from the 
back of the boat and the cod fight for the 
bait. In the process the fish inflict wounds 
on each other. The cod which gets the bait 
incurs mouth and body damage in the 
resulting tug-of-war. This activity is not
illegal as it doesn’t count as fishing, since 
the line has no hook. That this is permis­
sible in an area of the tightest zoning 
should lead us to reflect on the philosophy 
behind the zoning.
Another weakness in the manage­
ment philosophy is contained in the phrase 
from the quote above “before limitations 
can be placed on potentially destructive 
uses". In other words, if you can’t prove 
that an activity is hazardous, allow it to go 
ahead. One member of the GBRMPA 
even followed this philosophy through to 
oil drilling on the Reef, arguing in 1977 
that “if no research is done or if no unac­
ceptable risk can be demonstrated, ex­
ploratory drilling may well be permitted 
leading to exploitation if oil is discov­
ered”. Overseas witnesses to the Royal 
Commission on Petroleum Drilling in the 
Great Barrier Reef Waters in 1974 testi­
fied that an offshore oil industry, once 
established, could do more lasting damage 
to marine life through small but continu­
ous spills, detergent treatments, discharge 
of water and mud used in drilling and 
other kinds of pollution than would large 
and spectacular oil accidents. Yet the 
GBRMPA’s comments assume that no 
unacceptable risk has yet been demon­
strated. If that is the view of the body set 
up to conserve the Reef, what hope is 
there to reject the recent government 
initiatives to allow oil exploration adja­
cent to the Reef?
My central thesis is that when we are 
dealing with an area of such profound 
importance and fragility it is far preferable 
to prohibit, restrict or discourage activities 
unless we have good reasons for thinking 
they are harmless. This should apply to all 
activities in the Park, not just oil explora­
tion or drilling. Two others that desper­
ately need further restrictions are fishing 
and tourism. The harm that tourists and 
tourist development are doing to the Reef 
is abundantly clear to the casual observer. 
Yet tourism in the Caims area is increasing 
at a rate of roughly 30% per annum, and 
the GBRMPA gives permission for devel­
opment which could be predicted at the 
outset to be destructive.
The harm done by depletion of fish 
stocks may not become apparent until it is 
too late. There is very little research into 
the long-term viability of Reef fishing and 
attempts at monitoring reef fish have not 
been successful. There is not even consen­
sus cm the appropriate method for moni­
toring. Yet very little restriction is placed 
on what fish are taken. Again, the philoso­
phy is to wait and see if these practices are 
dangerous. Sadly, we might not have very 
long to wait.
Further flaws in the management phi­
losophy stem from its acceptance ofa land- 
based model which assumes that the area 
can be divided into reasonably distinct 
regions. This model is questionable on 
land, but it is nonsense in the sea. The 
larvae of marine plants and animals are 
sometimes dispersed in the plankton for 
hundreds of kilometres. The cod do not 
always stay intheirsmall Preservation Zone; 
they may stray into the nearby zone where 
trolling is legal. And scientists working in 
the Scientific Zone may be frustrated to 
find their subjects killed in legal fishing a 
few hundred metres from the shore.
A member of the Park management, in 
a bode Managing Marine Environments, 
designates ‘conservationists’ as an interest 
group to be given a hearing along with die 
fishing and tourist interests. This position 
sits rather oddly with the claim of die 
management philosophy to be concerned 
with conservation. It might be thought 
that this concern would make the manag­
ers ‘conservationists’ too, and not just peo­
ple responsive to conservationist interest 
groups.
Finally, ManagingMarine Environments 
further claims that the goal of “preserving 
coral reef undisturbed by humans” can be 
met by preserving 5% of reefs free from 
human access other than for purposes of 
approved research or management projects 
and, further, that this 5% should, as far as 
practicable, achieve minimum disruption 
to fishing and tourism. The intention is to 
preserve small “representative examples of 
ecosystems”. But this misunderstands the 
idea of an ecosystem; by definition, the 
parts can’t have autonomous existence. 
There are threats to the Reef from activities 
in areas adjacent to the Park—in particular 
from land run-off and proposed oil explo­
ration/drilling. A philosophy which ac­
cepts the zoning model within the Park 
makes it easy to look upon the Reef as a unit 
separate from the adjacent land and sea. It 
makes it difficult for the Authority to act as 
apolitical force countering the threats from 
adjacent areas. An acceptance of the 
interconnectedness of regions within the 
Park would make it easier to see the inter­
connections between the Reef and non- 
Reef areas. ■
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forms of the Reef. Other, less personal, instrumen­
tal reasons might relate to the Reefs utility to 
science, medicine and the Australian economy. 
Some non-instrumental reasons for valuing the 
Reef are that it is a remarkably stable self-regulat- 
ing system in some places largely untouched by 
humans; it is a system of great complexity and 
diversity.
Values, whether instrumental, are preferences. 
The above list reflects preferences of mine which 
seem to be fairly widely shared. Others may hold 
different values and find different reasons for 
valuing the Reef. Equally clearly there will be 
some who place value on the Reef for narrow 
instrumental reasons, or they may place no value 
on it at all. If values are merely preferences what 
basis is there for preventing actions that harm the 
Reef from people in these two groups?
If the Reef continues to be valued for narrow 
instrumental reasons then the outlook is very 
bleak even for the relevant resource. Take, for 
example, commercial fishing. Here we run the risk 
of what has been described as the parable of the 
‘tragedy of the commons’. According to a Cana­
dian author, Berkes, the tragedy is that fishing, left 
to itself, will be pursued to the point where there 
is no longer a sustainable yield. This follows when 
the following conditions hold:
(i) the users are selfish and are able to pursue 
private gain even against the best interests of the 
community;
(ii) the environment is limited and there is a 
resource use pattern in which the rate of exploita­
tion exceeds the natural rate of replenishment of 
the resource;
(iii) the resource is common property and 
freely open to any user.
In the case of the Great Barrier reef there have 
been attempts to resist ‘the tragedy of the com­
mons’; there are permit regulations concerning 
net sizes, quotas and seasonal bans. However, 
policing is difficult and there may be an economic 
incentive to break the regulations—and this of 
course may lead back to the ‘tragedy of the com­
mons’. In other parts of the world resource col­
lapse due to over-fishing is not uncommon. Yet 
there are some enlightening examples of self­
regulation. Many are in small non-western socie­
ties, but there are increasing instances in the 
industrialised world: whiting in the New York 
Bight region of the US; smelt in Lake Erie in 
Canada, and Cornish oyster fisheries in the UK. In 
all these cases the individualism of the fishermen 
was effectively limited for the good of the commu­
nity.
What about those who place no value on the 
Reef? Is there any way to persuade or cajole them 
into not harming it, given the position I have 
presented? Government regulations, including 
fines and other penalties, are necessary here, but a 
strategy which is more likely to be effective in the
long run is to try to encourage a change of mind. 
Just because values are preferences that doesn’t 
mean that there can’t be debate about them. It’s 
usually easier in our culture to get people to place 
a value on something on which they don’t already 
place a value if we can persuade them of its 
instrumental value. A possible argument could be: 
you shouldn’t harm the Reef as the unpolluted 
waters house excellent fish and many parts of the 
world have such pollution that the fish die or are 
contaminated. (O f course, this argument should 
only be pursued in moderation, since taken to 
extremes it could lead to over-fishing.)
Increasingly, Australians are expressing con­
cern about environmental degradation such as the 
blue/green algae problem in our rivers and the 
continuing problems with the ocean outfalls 
around cities like Sydney. These sorts of local 
problems foster an awareness of the limitations of 
normally self-regulating systems and are likely to 
lead to an attitude of caution towards human 
practices in relation to the environment even in 
those who do not put a great deal of value on it.
The management philosophy of bodies like 
the Barrier Reef Park Authority (see box) is based 
on achieving conservation with a minimum of 
regulation, in order to ensure a high level of usage 
consistent with maintaining the ecosystem con­
cerned. Yet supporting a high level of use and a 
diversity of human activities in a fragile environ­
ment runs counter to the aim of conservation. 
One tenet of this management philosophy is that 
any activities which have not been proven hazard­
ous for the local environment should be permit­
ted. I would argue on the contrary that in areas of 
profound importance and fragility such as the 
Barrier Reef it is far preferable to prohibit or 
discourage activities unless we have good reasons 
for thinking they are harmless.
Policies which aim at overall protection, not 
just preservation of representative examples of 
ecosystems, would seem to be suggested by the 
sorts of arguments I have outlined here. Such 
policies would allow activities only if there is 
reasonable assurance that they won’t disturb the 
self-regulation of the Reef. Such a direction is 
dictated by prudence, not by ethics.
Can this endpoint be used to develop an 
environmental philosophy in general? It might be 
worthwhile thinking about. If such philosophies 
are centrally located in ethics, they face the prob­
lems mentioned above. Juxtaposing the two main 
environmental concerns: (1) the limitedness of 
natural resources; (2) the stress put on natural 
resources by the expanding human population, it 
would seem that a philosophy based on prudence 
might ha ve a better chance of warding off destruc­
tion than any other. ■
DENISE RUSSELL teaches in general philoso' 
phy at Sydney University.
It is usually 
easier to get 
people to place 
a value on 
something if you 
can persuade 
them of its 
usefulness.
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